Programme
Sessions
July 6, 2011
Intuitionistic epistemic logic and game theory: 11.30 – 13.00
11.30 – 12.00: A Measure of Inference in Classical and Intuitionistic Logics – Mamoru Kaneko, University of Tsukuba; Nobu-Yuki Suzuki, Shizuoka University
12.00 – 12.30: Quantified Intuitionistic Epistemic Logics of Shallow Depths for Game Theory - Nobu-Yuki Suzuki, Shizuoka University
12.30 – 13.00: Binary Aggregation with Integrity Constraints – Umberto Grandi, ILLC - University of Amsterdam
Agendas and Voting Rules: 15.00 – 16.30
15.00 – 15.30: Measuring Consensus in a Preference Approval Context – David Perez-Roman, University of Valladolid; Bora Erdamar, Istanbul Bilgi University; Jose Luis Garcia-Lapresta, University of Valladolid; M. Remzi Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University
15.30 – 16.00: Social Choice Theory with Collectively Qualified Agendas – Yukinori Iwata, Nishogakusha University
16.00 – 16.30: Electoral Equilibria under Scoring Rules – Arkadii Slinko, The University of Auckland; Dodge Kahan, The University of Auckland; Konstantin Tchernov, The University of Auckland
Game Theory I: 15.00 – 16.30
15.00 – 15.30:Justifiying Preferences – Daniele Porello, ILLC - University of Amsterdam
15.30 – 16.00: The Axiomatization of the Prenucleolus for Some Classes of Veto-balanced Games – Ilya Katsev, St-Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics; Rene van den Brink, VU University, Amsterdam; Gerard van der Laan, VU University, Amsterdam
16.00 – 16.30: Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core - László Á. Kóczy, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Óbuda University
July 7, 2011
Manipulability: 11.30 – 13.00
11.30 – 12.00: Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability – Lars Ehlers, Université de Montréal; Tommy Andersson, Lund University; Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Lund University
12.00 – 12.30: Sincerity and Manipulation under Approval Voting – Ulle Endriss, ILLC - University of Amsterdam
12.30 – 13.00: Swap-proof and Constrained Gerrymander-Proof Representative Democracies – Sebastian Bervoets, CNRS-Greqam; Vincent Merlin, CNRS - Crem
Evolution and social conventions: 11.30 – 12.30
11.30 – 12.00: Local Conventions in Game Play in an Evolving Dual Social Network Framework - Robert Gilles, Queen's University Belfast; Zhengzheng Pan, Virginia Bioinformatics Institute, Blacksburg
12.00 – 12.30: Evolution of Optimism in a Population of Agents Playing a Public Goods Game – Dimitry Rtischev, Gakushuin University
Allocations and the Shapley value: 15.00 – 16.30
15.00 – 15.30: Stable Matchings as Equilibria Allocations in a Gale-Shapley Market Model – Zbigniew Switalski, Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Science and Econometrics, University of Zielona Gora
15.30 – 16.00: Whose Deletion does not Affect Your Payoff? The Difference Between the Shapley Value, the Egalitarian Value, the Solidarity Value, and the Banzhaf Value – Takumi Kongo, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University; Yoshio Kamijo, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study
16.00 – 16.30: The λ-nucleolus for NTU Games and Shapley Transfer Procedure - Chih Chang, National Tsing Hua University; Peng An Chen, National Taitung University
Economic Behavior: 15.00 – 16.30
15.00 – 15.30: On ‘Self-interest’ and Economic Behaviour in a Game-theoretical Setting – Valentin Cojanu, The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
15.30 – 16.00: From Individual to Social Choice in Tax Compliance: a Parallel Games Model – Alexandra Gheondea Eladi, University of Bucharest
16.00 – 16.30: The Advisory Role of Boards of Directors – Jack Stecher, Carnegie Mellon University; Gorm Andreas, Gronnevet NHH
Game Theory II: 17.00 – 18.30
17.00 – 17.30: Hierarchical Simple Games – Arkadii Slinko, The University of Auckland; Tatiana Gvozdeva, The University of Auckland; Ali Hameed, The University of Auckland
17.30 – 18.00: The Prenucleolus for Games with Restricted Cooperation – Ilya Katsev, St-Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics; Elena Yanovskaya, St-Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics
18.00 – 18.30: Emergence of a Nested Coalition Structure In a Sequential Bargaining Game – Haruo Imai, Kyoto University
Voting Rules and Voting Power: 17.00 – 18.30
17.00 – 17.30: On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction – Frank Steffen, University of Liverpool Management School; Rene van den Brink, VU University, Amsterdam
17.30 – 18.00: The Borda Majority Count – Manzoor Ahmad Zahid, Tilburg University; Harrie de Swart, Tilburg University
18.00 – 18.30: Application of the Forgotten Voting Rules on Adopting Laws in the Romanian Parliament – Rodica Corina Cristea, National School of Political and Administrative Studies
Provisional Programme
July 6, 2011
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8.30 - 9.15
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Registration
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| 9.15 - 9.30 | Conference opening | |
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9.30 – 11.00
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Plenarry session: "The War on Manipulation. News from the Battlefield" - Piotr Foliszewski
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11.00 – 11.30
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Coffee break
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11.30 – 13.00
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Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic and Game Theory
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13.00 – 15.00
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Lunch
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15.00 – 16.30
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Agendas and Voting Rules
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Game Theory I
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16.30 – 17.00
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Coffee break
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17.00 – 18.30
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Plenarry session: "Rights, Social Choice, Logic" - Maurice Salles
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| 20:00 | Dinner | |
July 7, 2011
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9.30 – 11.00
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Plenarry session: "Logic, Language and Games" - Gabriel Sandu, Alexandru Baltag, Oliver Roy
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11.00 –11.30
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Coffee break
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11.30 –13.00
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Manipulability
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Evolution and Social Conventions
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13.00 –15.00
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Lunch
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15.00 –16.30
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Allocations and the Shapley Value
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Economic Behavior
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16.30 –17.00
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Coffee break
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17.00 –18.30
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Game Theory II
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Voting Rules and Voting Power
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July 8, 2011 - Excursion
